It has long been recognized that operation of vehicles on the public highways is a conditional privilege and not a natural right, and that the various states, under their police power, have the authority to stipulate reasonable conditions under which the privilege may be exercised. Courts have upheld the revocation of licenses of residents of a state for offenses committed within the state, 5 and have also permitted the imposition of G4IMINAL LAW COMMENTS certain regulations upon non-resident motorists. 6 The Wyoming statute presents the additional question of whether a state has the power to use out-of-state traffic offenses as a basis for the revocation of drivers' licenses.
An argument that might be advanced against the validity of the Wyoming statute is that regardless of a state's right to make a domestic occurrence cause for revocation of a license, it is an unreasonable extension of police power to use as a cause an extrastate happening, because in so doing the state extends its police power beyond its borders.
7 Such a contention would seem to overlook the fact, however, that a state is not limited to its own boundaries in guarding the safety of its citizens; it may and frequently does take cognizance of what happens in other states. provided that a person's license should be suspended for failure to pay within 30 days a final judgment of $50 or more secured against him in a court in any state or Canada for damages on account of personal or property injury resulting from operation of a motor vehicle. The court rejected the contention that it was an unconstitutional extension of police power to revoke a license for failure to pay a judgment of a court of another state.
Although there are no cases directly in point, it seems very unlikely that suspension of a license for an out-of-state traffic offense would be deemed unconstitutional as an unreasonable restraint on interstate commerce. Compare the cases cited supra note 6.
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CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS would seem to provide drivers with adequate protection from possible administrative abuse.' 0 Few judicial opinions could be located dealing with statutory provisions similar to those in the Wyoming statute. In Kerns Appeal" the Secretary of Revenue of Pennsylvania suspended the license of a resident of that state who had been convicted in New Jersey for violating the speed limit of New Jersey. In affirming the suspension, the Pennsylvania court discussed the essential reasonableness of the statute in the following language: "The real purpose of the act under which petitioner's license was suspended was to control the licenses of those operators who do not obey the motor vehicle regulations on the public highways, whether they demonstrate their disregard, recklessness or unfitness in Pennsylvania or elsewhere."
The section of the Wyoming act authorizing the suspension, cancellation, or revocation of licenses for out-of-state offenses is apt to present difficult problems of administration which may defeat its purpose. One such problem may arise from the requirement that the offense must be one "which, if committed in this State, would be grounds for suspension or revocation.' 1 2 Because of the lack of uniformity in the traffic codes of the various states, the Highway Department and reviewing courts may have difficulty in determining whether a violation for which a driver has been convicted in another state is one which would be recognized as an offense in Wyoming. In Cashion v. Harnett, 13 a New York resident had been convicted in Massachusetts for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and his right to drive in Massachusetts had been suspended. The commissioner of motor vehicles of New York thereupon revoked his New York chauffeur's license pursuant to a New York statute 14 which provided that a driver's license must be revoked for driving "while intoxicated," even though the conviction may be in another state. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, however, sustained an order of certiorari annulling the revocation of the license on the grounds that proof of intoxication was essential for conviction under the New York statute, but not under the Massachusetts law, which merely forbade "driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor"; hence 1o Note 4 supra. 1151 District and County Reports 136 (Pa. 1944) . The motorist contended at the hearing that while he had on four occasions exceeded the New Jersey speed limit of 40 miles per hour, he had never exceeded 50 miles per hour, the Pennsylvania limit. He, therefore, c6ntended that the Pennsylvania authorities could not suspend or revoke his license; for he had done nothing which would violate the Pennsylvania law had the action occurred in Pennsylvania. But the court held that this was a difference of degree only and did not change the essence, substance, or identity of the offense; for the offense was that of "speeding"
and it made no difference in what state it occurred. The law of the state wherein the offense was committed was held to govern, a conviction therein was res judicata in Pennsylvania, and the Pennsylvania Secretary of Revenue could, therefore, suspend the license. The suspension was pursuant to Pa. Stats. 75, §192(e), Laws (1929) 
